

July 1-60

12-17

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Upon the nomination of a Democratic candidate for President the question may arise as to your policy with regard to the intelligence briefing of the candidate.

This matter was raised in your press conference on Wednesday, March 30, as reported in the 'New York Times' of March 31. Mr. Edward F. Morgan of American Broadcasting Company asked, as the second part of a double-barreled question, 'What is your view on the suggestions that after the nominees are actually picked they be given high-level intelligence briefings.'

As reported, your answer was: 'Well, the second part, to take that first--always we do that. They did it for me in 1952, and I did it in '56, as quick as the nominees are named they begin to get it, and for this very practical reason: One of the two of them is the successor, he is the obvious successor, and so you have to keep him informed.'

You may wish to consider the desirability of taking the initiative, upon the nomination of the Democratic candidate, of reaffirming the position you took last March before the matter is raised by the press or otherwise. Possibly you might wish to give me instructions to proceed to get into contact with the candidate to set up the procedures for the briefings.

Respectfully yours,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

STAT

Declassified by
date 21 OCT 1974

July 12, 60

CHH. Advised me
that the President

wished to defer action

until both candidates

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offer briefings to both

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[Handwritten signature]

20 July 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

The Director spoke with Mr. Arthur C. Perry, Administrative Assistant to Senator Lyndon B. Johnson and advised Mr. Perry that the White House had asked the Director to get in touch with the Senator and put himself at the Senator's disposition for a briefing; that it was nothing urgent, but that the Director just wanted the Senator to know that he was available. The Director mentioned that he had tried to reach the Senator at his Ranch but was informed that he would be away for a few days, and the Director just wanted him to know that he had tried to reach him. The Director also mentioned that he was briefing Senator Kennedy on Saturday.

The Director then asked Mr. Perry if he would know when the Senator returned to the Ranch, and Mr. Perry indicated that he would be advised. The Director said he would very much appreciate it if Mr. Perry would let this office know so that we might be in touch with the Senator at his Ranch.

SECRET

Executive Registry

60-6067

3 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pursuant to your directive, I briefed Senator John F. Kennedy on Saturday, July 23, and Senator Lyndon B. Johnson on Thursday, July 28, at their respective residences, at Hyannis Port, Massachusetts and at the Johnson Ranch in Texas. Each briefing covered slightly over two hours and the candidates were alone with me throughout the briefing.

The two briefings covered the same general subject matter; namely, recent developments in Sino-Soviet policy; an analysis of Soviet strategic attack capabilities in missiles and long-range bombers and of Soviet nuclear testing prior to the moratorium and the background of the RB-47 incident. This was followed by developments in the Berlin situation, in Cuba and the Congo and in other strategically important areas including the Middle East, Iran, the Formosa Straits, and Communist China; also NATO problems and France and Algeria.

Both candidates were particularly interested in developments that might arise during the campaign, particularly with regard to Berlin, Cuba, and the Congo.

Following the briefing on Soviet missile developments, Senator Kennedy asked how we ourselves stood in the missile race. I replied that the Defense Department was the competent authority on this question and the Senator remarked that he hoped to see Secretary Gates and also expressed a desire to have a talk with Secretary Herter. I said that I would mention this to you which I had the opportunity of doing at the NSC Meeting on Monday, July 25.

Senator Kennedy also asked my opinion as to the likelihood of an early attack on the Offshore Islands in the Taiwan Straits and inquired about the present status of the Nuclear Test Conference. He said he desired to have another briefing when he returned to Washington.

Senator Johnson, in addition to his particular interest in Soviet missile development, gave particular attention to developments in the Caribbean, including Mexico.

In reply to my inquiry as to whether he expected to have any meetings of his Preparedness Subcommittee when Congress reconvened, Senator Johnson said he did not think it was likely unless the issue of important additional defense expenditures came before the Congress.

Both candidates made brief statements to the press following the briefings. Senator Kennedy was informal, expressing appreciation for the briefing. Senator Johnson read a short statement which he showed to me before he read it. A copy is appended.

Respectfully yours,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Enclosure

AWD/ji

1 - DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - ER

1 - DDI

Statement by Senator Lyndon B. Johnson - July 28, 1960
(no place of issue, but it was issued at the LBJ Ranch, Johnson City, Texas.)

Mr. Dulles and I have had a frank and fruitful discussion of many of the key international problems facing America today.

We covered the major trouble spots in the world and the latest information available to our intelligence sources.

While this meeting was arranged at the suggestion of the President, it is not a new experience for me. Mr. Dulles and I have had many prior discussions and meetings of a similar nature in relation to my responsibilities as Senate Majority Leader and Chairman of the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee. Naturally, this information is of a highly classified nature. I do not intend to go into matters which are properly the subject of security.

But I think it should be made crystal clear to the masters of the Communist world that there is no division in America when it comes to the question of Communism, however vigorous the forthcoming campaign may be and however sharp the language that may be used from time to time, both parties are absolutely united in their determined opposition to Communism.

For that reason I believe these briefings have a distinct value. They give us a common front of knowledge upon which to draw and they act as a symbol of the fact that in the United States, political activity is a method of selecting our leadership and not of tearing our country to pieces.

One thing is clear to all Americans, simply from the events of the past weeks and months, that is the simple fact that nothing has occurred to abate the Communist threat to the peace of the Free World, or to give any justification for complacency -- either by the Government or by the American people.

End

31 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Conversation between the Director and Mr. Pierre Salinger

The Director stated that he had seen a reference in connection with the Paul Nitze announcement - and that while he was not pressing - he wanted Senator Kennedy to know that he was ready at any time to give him another briefing.

Mr. Salinger said that he was sure that the Senator realized this. He stated that he believed the announcement had also mentioned that the Senator had expected to have a Defense briefing. Earlier, however, David Kendall had advised that this would not be possible; but that now the President had decided to give the Defense briefing to him.

The Director said that he thought it had all been straightened out now.

The Director then said that he was ready at any time before the Senator gets away - to show photographs, etc.

Mr. Salinger thanked the Director.

JI

21 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

On Saturday night, 17 September, about 9:00 p.m., while I was dining with Mr. and Mrs. John Walker, I received a telephone call from a member of Senator Kennedy's staff, stating the Senator would like a briefing on Monday morning, 19 September, at 10:45 at his house in Georgetown.

I answered that I would be available at the time and place mentioned. The contact was apparently made to me following a call to our Watch Office, as their log shows:

8:15 p.m. Mr. Robert Kennedy called requesting Mr. Dulles' telephone number. Advised Mr. Kennedy that Mr. Dulles presently dining at residence of John Walker ... provided him with number. Mr. Kennedy then requested Mr. Dulles' home telephone number. Provided.

When I reached the Kennedy house on Monday morning, there were no press men or photographers in the neighborhood and there has been no press reference to the briefing.

When I arrived, Senator Kennedy was in conference with Senator Gore and several others and I had a chance to talk with a man who was waiting and who identified himself to me as Prince Sadruddin Khan, the brother of the late Aly Khan and uncle of the Aga Khan. I found we had met some years ago. I expressed deep sympathy at the tragic death of his brother; inquired about the Aga Khan. He told me that he was working with one of the U.N. agencies.

When Senator Kennedy came out, I insisted that he see Prince Sadruddin ahead of me as I knew this meeting would be very brief while I would be with the Senator for some time.

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Following this I had about a half-hour talk with the Senator before he took off for Charleston, West Virginia. He had two questions:

1. What was Khrushchev's basic objective in coming to the U. N. and what was he likely to do, and
2. What were the critical areas which might blow up over the next six or seven weeks prior to the election.

I told the Senator that there were various different prognostications as to Khrushchev's behavior but I thought that basically he wished to try to work out a meeting with the President and would not want to go back if he could help it, without this meeting. I said that despite all that had taken place, the Russian people still consider that the President is a man of great standing and prestige and that it would not help Khrushchev's prestige if he did not have this meeting. I said, of course, that he would make much of this opportunity to contact Bloc and neutralist leaders, and in particular try to influence the African leaders. I had a feeling that he would not be over-belligerent in his public addresses in order not to destroy the possibility of a meeting with the President, although he would not overlook the issue of overflights, etc. I felt that he had been building up crises in various areas - Berlin, Congo, Cuba, as a background to his visit in order to stress the importance of everybody getting together and making pious declarations about disarmament, and the like. Much, of course, would depend upon the treatment and reception he received at the U. N. and he was capable of outbursts in case he were annoyed or thwarted in his objectives.

I then reviewed briefly the troubled areas: Cuba, Congo, Berlin, Laos, Jordan, Syria, Sino-Soviet disputes, the apparent success of the Soviet's orbiting into space of animals, etc.

The Senator asked me if I had read General Medaris' book in which he seemed to take a very great interest. I said that I had not although I had read some articles of his. He asked me whether the UAR was going to be voted in as a member of the Security Council. I said that I did not know, that it was about their turn, but as far as I knew no final decision had been reached.


Before leaving I made it clear to the Senator that I was available for briefing him whenever he desired, although I had some plans for going to Europe in October if the U. N. meeting settled down to more routine work. I said that I would leave it to his judgment as to when he might wish a briefing.

The Senator was cordial, talked briefly about the campaign. I said I did not think that he had made many mistakes. He laughed and said that well, possibly not, except for his reference to an apology on the U-2 incident, which had been rather misconstrued.


25X1

[redacted] advised the White House (Colonel Eisenhower) on Monday prior to the meeting, and I reported on the meeting to Gerry Morgan on the day following.

On 23 September, I also briefed Brig. Gen. A. J. Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to the President, on the above meeting with Senator Kennedy.


ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

Distribution: None

P.S. (Added later. Previous paragraph was dictated on Sept 21. 

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Wilton B. Parsons
Assistant to the President

SUBJECT : Intelligence Support for the President-elect
During the Period November 1952 to January 1953

1. During the period between the election in November 1952 and the inauguration, the Director of Central Intelligence established a briefing facility for the convenience of President-elect Eisenhower. This facility was located in the Commodore Hotel in New York City near the interim headquarters maintained for the President-elect. A briefing officer representing the DCI was present at all times. He received the daily current intelligence products of the Agency and held them available at the call of the President-elect.

2. In addition to this facility the Director of Central Intelligence continued the series of briefings initiated during the campaign prior to the elections. These briefings included presentations on broader topics as well as more detailed information than was available from the daily current reporting delivered to the briefing facility.

3. A regular courier service was operated to deliver the daily intelligence products to the briefing officer in the Commodore Hotel and secure wire communications were established for interim service when this was necessary.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

CI/CD/MIL: [] (10 Nov 50)

Distribution:

Orig [] - Addressee

- 2 - DCI
- 1 - DDGI
- 1 - DU/1
- 1 - AD/CI
- 1 - CD/MIL

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date

[] STAT
21 DEC 1953

The President does not believe that intelligence briefings are a proper subject ^{for} of public debate. But in the light of ^{The} ~~Mr. Nixon's~~ account, it seems necessary to say that Senator Kennedy knew nothing of any plans for "supporting an invasion of Cuba" before the election of 1960. Mr. Nixon's comment is apparently based on a misunderstanding of what was included in the briefings Senator Kennedy received in July and September 1960.

in Mr Nixon's
book

The two covered
announcements
were told
before the
election of the
train of Troops

The President does not believe that intelligence briefings are a proper subject for public debate but in the light of the account in Mr. Nixon's book it is necessary to say that the then Senator Kennedy was not told before the election in 1960 of the training of troops outside of Cuba or of any plans for "supporting an invasion of Cuba". Mr. Nixon's account is apparently based on a misunderstanding. Senator Kennedy received two briefings - the first on July ²³~~26~~, 1960 and the second on September ¹⁹~~18~~, 1960. The two briefings covered ^{an} ~~the~~ over-all review of the ~~world~~ world situation during which Cuba was mentioned ~~by Senator~~ but Senator Kennedy was first informed of the operation to which Mr. Nixon referred in a briefing by Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell of the CIA given in Palm Beach, Florida, on November ~~18~~ 18, 1960. *Allen Dulles*

FOOTNOTE to be included in new editions of Mr. Nixon's book:

It is my understanding (and that of all others within the Administration familiar with the operation) that the objective of this training program was for the eventual purpose of supporting an invasion of Cuba itself. President Kennedy has since said (March 20, 1962) however, that when he was briefed on the CIA training program he was not specifically informed that its purpose was to support an invasion.

References to "covert operations and intelligence estimates" and "supporting an invasion" will be deleted from the book.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles

Attached are memoranda to the President through the Secretary of State and to General Persons, dated 9 July 1960 and 15 November 1960 respectively, regarding briefings for the "Democratic candidate for President." I can find no reply to these memoranda other than your note of 12 July 1960 appearing on the 9 July memo.

We are still unable to locate the memorandum Mr. Nixon said he sent to us. As I indicated in our conversation this morning, this includes searching the records in the Director's office, the Executive Registry, and the DD/P.

WSE

21 March 1962

(DATE)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(4*)

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date 21 OCT 1974

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